

Research Article
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The Logical Limits and The Ontological Principle of The Idea of University

Abstract

This article settles an account with the idea of “university” that has been a traditional debate in philosophy. An idea can be accepted as necessarily true by a consensus among some reasonable people, if and only if, its premises could be grounded on true knowledge, and its result could be reached by true reasoning. Then, we have three questions: What is the idea of university, why should it be necessary, and how can a norm be grounded on knowledge? Behind the idea of modern university there is a principle called “Universitas”, named “metaphysics” by Kant, and “*prote philosophia*” by Aristotle. The opposite of it would be postmodern university, called “multiversity” in principle. Here, we ground the norm *Universitas* by the logical form of *reductio ad absurdum*, under the light of the knowledge of the value of some possibilities of human being, or simply, of human dignity.

Keywords

Universitas, multiversity, Kant, third generation university, alienation.

The idea of university had been established for thousands of years, dating to the beginning of history written by Sumerians. A famous Sumerian, and the author of *The Sumerians*, (with the early -1951-subtitle: *A Pre-Greek System of Education*) Kramer (1963) noticed that the level of such intellectual and scientific success could only be seen during the modern era (p. 229). Contemplation and classification of beings are the features of Sumerian science and are also the basis of Aristotelian science. Plato's *Academia* and Aristotle's *Lykeion* are respectively the concrete theory and an institutional practice of the idea. Aristotelian philosophy with Neo-Platonist ingredients was the founding idea of the first medieval Christian "Universitas" as a continuation alongside the parallel of the Islamic "Madrasah". The difference of *Universitas* comes from its role in European politics. Papal and imperial guidance and priorities had affected the organisational style and curriculum of universities. The Popes and imperial rulers desired to be theoretically and ideologically accepted and to be justified as the universally valid authority. Acting as an ideological apparatus fulfils one medieval meaning of the idea of *Universitas* (Rueg, 2003: 8).

As far as we may follow the philosophical texts, the idea of university was first elaborated by Kant in his work *The Conflict of the Faculties*, published in 1789. Von Humboldt had politically joined him ten years later. They both thought that the autonomy of the university against that state would benefit society through the growth of a national character. In 1810, the university in Berlin had been established on their and Schleiermacher's ideas as the first modern national research university. The second text came in 1852 from Cardinal Newman with the title of *The idea of a University*. He was a liberal Catholic, and defended the idea "theory for theory" as the autonomy principle of education against the utilitarian attitude of the modern national state. The next famous article, *Die Idee Der Universität*, appeared after a century in 1923 and 1946, written by Karl Jaspers. He stressed the concept *Universitas* as the basis of the idea. He held an elitist position, and thought that if qualified and skilful students are educated through scientific researches within the great universal knowledge they existentially develop an integrated personality (Fincher, 2000: 1-6).

The final article, *Die Idee Der Universität*, was written in 1987 by Habermas. His logical position was expressed as clearly as Kant's position. He totally rejected this "idea" tradition. For him, the problem is a part of language-games, as Schleiermacher and Wittgenstein had pointed out. The idea of university lacks necessity, unless the idea is shared in a society with meaningful communication, and if the relation between university and the "life-world" is healthy, thereupon the idea of university may offer a universality or totality. But the subject is so complex that it should not be underestimated. At least, we can say that there are some methodological relations and rules with a transcendental role between social interests, human being and the natural and social sciences (Habermas, 1987: 3-22).

By the end of these texts on the idea of university, we may have certain logical positions, and can develop the argument so as to overcome "the complexity that should not be underestimated". It is so obvious that, in general logic, there is no ontological proposition or knowledge that is naturally necessary or categorically true by itself. The truth of any ontological proposition is always dependent on other ontological propositions, because they are in an "is" relation with some natural conditions. They are

hypothetical judgements, and have certain objects to prove them. That is why they are called “knowledge”. But an idea is not knowledge or hypothesis that can be justified by its object. An idea has no object; it may merely have a categorical “ought to” relation with its own conceptual totality in the species-genus relation. Nevertheless, **an idea can still be accepted as an apodictic judgement, necessarily true by a consensus among some reasonable people if and only if its premises could be grounded on true knowledge, and its result could be reached by true reasoning.** Then, the question of what is or is not the idea of university that we might build a consensus on would necessarily and logically be dependent on the questions of which or what kind of thought could make us think that it would be necessary, and how a discourse consisting of the categorical “ought to” relation could be grounded on knowledge, namely on the hypothetical “is” relation? Thereby we have three problematic titles we are going to deal with here so as to reach a proof. Two of them are external problems: 1) How an “ought to” discourse is based on “is”; 2) is there any categorical principle that could be the norm of the idea of university; and 3) how a necessary principle or namely, a norm, can be grounded by reasoning.

The target of the first two steps is to develop a basis to reach a logical proof for the ontological principle at the third subtitle. The concept *Universitas* would have a central position throughout these three steps. *Universitas* was the Latin, original name of university. Even though there is a contingent relation between a name and its reference, as Saussure has pointed out, the meaning of the word *Universitas* has been consciously developed for university through its history. The original meaning of the word *Universitas* was “union” of students and/or masters. But it has been turned to the strict meaning “universality”, “generality”, being a place of “universals”. The epistemological role of universals over singulars has also been kept in a central position by Kant. If the history of metaphysics is considered, it can be seen that the universal-singular relation, like unity-multiplicity, identity-difference, etc. is the main vein of the metaphysical ore. In Kant’s discipline of categories this main metaphysical ore appears somehow, and Kant makes it one of the *a priori* categories of understanding as a transcendental epistemological principle. We pick up this category *Universitas*, and take it as a key to understand Kant’s and the others’ philosophical systems and apply this epistemological principle to the idea of university so as to reach the ontological “autonomy” principle of university.

1. The logical Ground Or Methodology of The Discourse: Anthropological Ontology

It is a sceptical tradition to separate “is” from “ought to”, or “fact” from “value”. Its reputation comes from Hume’s indication that says that *a priories* like “necessity” are not *ideae innatae* or analytic but psychological or synthetic. As is well known, this story ends up with Ayer and Strawson’s emotivism. Actually, they are right in that; we are living in emotional, psychological, cultural garbage by mixing these two categories. But there is no other way to live. What this exaggeration has missed is this: we can theoretically clarify this garbage by finding a true relation between fact and value. The whole tradition of philosophical anthropology from Aristotle to Kant has dealt with this

problem. Basically, philosophical anthropology states that science is a result of human existence, not a direct result of the existence of nature itself. Any explanation of “existence” should be based on the knowledge of the ontological possibilities of human being. Under the title of philosophical anthropology, this is called anthropological ontology or “**anthropontology**”¹. Consequently, the ontological reason of an idea can be based on the knowledge of some ontological possibilities of human being, and then this knowledge can be transformed to a norm that would be the principle of this idea. This is because any ontological reasoning is a result of the effects of human values or other ideas. Recall the function of ideas over understanding in Kant; he says that “*the absolute whole of appearances is only an idea, since, because we can never project it in an image. (...) [Nevertheless] always fruitful in the highest degree and avoidably necessary in respect of actual actions*” (Kant, 2000: 402-403) (para. A328/B434-435). This is because without ideas in the practical use of reason, there would be no reason to apply the categories of understanding on anything to project an image. Or consider Aristotle’s (1928) first word in *Metaphysics*: “*All men naturally desire knowledge*” (πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει) [980a][21]. This is the difference of the human species: there is a natural relation between knowledge and interests. The desire to know truth is more important than surviving. A murdered person always asks the reason “why” before dying, but doesn’t ask “can I survive”. Men or women realise their status as human beings via knowing, the main difference compared with the other animals.

Furthermore, if any sceptic refuses this connection ($p \rightarrow q$) between the norm (p) and its ontological ground (q) because there was not such an ontological ground (in *modus tollens* form: $p \rightarrow q, \sim q / \sim p$), they would create a contradiction, and wouldn’t have a right to refuse the norm since they maintain their sceptical position. Otherwise, they would have transformed an “ought not to” from “is not”, and set up a negative norm. Even the fact-value distinction turns out to be a new scientific value, and a second contradiction. Therefore, we have to leave open the door for the scientific grounding of ideas.

The relation of universals and singulars is a philosophical debate, but at least it is clear that to know is to know universals (Russell, 2007: 69). Furthermore, knowing some singulars through universals is always realised in a higher general context, in a relation between universals. This highest general relational position of universals (Lat. *summa genera*) is occupied by the *a priori*s. Here, we are in a position to defend an *a priori*: *Universitas* as an epistemological principle of general knowledge. *Universitas* expresses the quantitative, numerical generality or totality of knowledge: “*Thus allness (totality) [Universitas] is nothing other than plurality considered as a unity*” (Kant, 2000: 215) (para. B111). Leaving aside the problem of the roots of *a priori*s, *Universitas* has an ontological application, not only to any appearance of singulars but also to the appearance of all knowledge and science as well. But it should certainly be borne in mind that the *Universitas* of whole sciences as a principle for the university institution is not a real wholeness or immanent totality of all scientific contents. This

¹ The word “anthropontology” in this sense has been contributed by Betül Çotuksöken. See, Çotuksöken, 2010: p. 44

point is what Hegel had misunderstood, and all the analytic, pragmatist, Marxist and postmodern philosophers attacked this idea of *Universitas*. Hegel's objective idealism has created this mistake, and all the counter ideas against which we defend here are based on this mistake. On the contrary, Kant's position (like Aristotle) is clear: "*the plane for the whole of a science insofar it rests on a priori concepts, and dividing it mathematically in accordance with determinate principles*" is a transcendental plan (Kant, 2000: 214) (para. B109).

Kant's definition of metaphysics as an architectonic unity of all sciences and disciplines is entirely based on Aristotle's idea of *prote philosophia*. In a transcendental sense, the distinctive principles of the sciences have a hierarchical unity from the simple to the complex, from the logical principles to the ontological ones, and then to the ethical and political principles that decide the importance and organisation of all these for education:

Now of these characteristics that of knowing all things must belong to him who has in the highest degree universal knowledge; for he knows in the sense all the instances that [those] fall under the universals. (...) And the most exact of the sciences are those which involve fewer principles are more exact than those which involve additional principles, e.g. arithmetic than geometry (Aristotle, 1928: para. 982a 22-28)

This is a transcendental epistemological plan that has some ontological applications. So, if human being is in a position to realise ontologically him/herself through knowing, then *Universitas* as an epistemological principle has something to do with being human distinct from other animals. Only a human being can recognise his/her distinctive power and skills, define his/herself within an idea or a universal consisting of the totality of these distinctive powers and skills, and finally try to fix his/herself in this idea produced by him/herself so as to create him/herself constantly. Only a human being can burn him/herself, and recreate again him/herself from his/her own ashes. Even Plato (1997) announces philosophy as death, "*to separate the soul as far as possible from the body*" (p.58) (*Phaedo*, para. 67b) based on this job: To turn the whole *Psykhé* with the philosophical *Techné* so as to make appear the brightest truth *Aletheia* (p.1136) (*Republic VII*, para. 518d). Philosophy is the art of self-creation, *autopoiëton* of a human being him/herself, *anthropou poiësis*, like the divine job (p. 290) (*Sophist*, para. 265e).

2. *Universitas*, the Categorical Principle as the Norm of the Idea of University

The idea of university is based on the totality, the *Universitas* of these skills or faculties of a human being so as to bring him/her in a position to be able to create his/her totality autonomously and freely. The existential process of a human being that is different from the other animals is a mental process. Entities of the physical processes hold their own totality in themselves. But the totality of any mental process needs to be integrated consciously. Not only any single individual but also any superior structure of human civilisation, any institution, university or state as a mental process needs to be organised according to this epistemological principle of *Universitas*, the ontological

principle of autonomy, and the ethical principle of freedom. In *The Concept of Mind*, Gilbert Ryle gives university as an example for explaining his famous concept “category mistake”. The answer of the question “where is the university” cannot be a building; existentially it is a mental organisation. A mental organisation needs to be rationally organised.

Here we have confronted with an interesting point – the idea of university. The idea has directly carried us to the core of philosophy. The idea of university lies in the central axis of philosophy. That is why university is the institutionalised form of philosophy. The faculties of a university should be determined according to the faculties of human beings; namely, the knowledge of the natural processes produced by scientific practices should be organised so as to reach the target: realisation of some rational evaluations for reproducing social life, at least according to basic human rights. The lack of any one of these three faculties would mean the degradation of the value of human being. Will without knowledge wouldn't reach the end, knowledge without will would serve the other's end, willing without an end would be meaningless. The main aspects of the distribution of the faculties can be seen on Table 1:

Table 1. The distribution of the faculties that define human in philosophy

Biological roots	Genetic data	Survival instinct	Organisational behaviour
Faculties	Cognition	Will	Action (decision)
Their objects	Meaning	Value	End, target
Philosophical theories	Theory of meaning	Axiology (→)	Decision theory
Propositional types in logic	Meaning propositions	Hierarchical evaluating propositions	Acting propositions
Fields	Science	Ethics	Art
Kant's question	What can I know	What ought I to do	What may I hope
Reducing the faculties to one (roughly)	<i>To cognition:</i> Parmenides, Socrates, Aristotle, Kant	<i>To will:</i> Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bergson	<i>To action:</i> Heraclitus, Hegel, Marx, James-Dewey

Through the history of philosophy human being has been defined with these three distinctive powers: Cognition, will and decision. The biological origins of these powers are respectively, genetic data, survival instinct and organisational behaviour. For human intelligence these skills have turned to knowing the meanings of things, willing and evaluating according to some values, and deciding to create an end with pleasure in an action. In parallel with our ontological distinction and from a logical point of view, Davidson has also proven that there are three irreducible propositions which express meaning, thought (evaluating) and action (Davidson, 2001: 141-155). Some philosophers have reduced the triad to one by keeping their *Universitas*, and others have also reduced these to one and denied the two others, like pragmatists. If you are not able to reduce them to each other then you have three separated theories: Meaning theory, axiology and decision theory. However, Danold Davidson (2004) tried a logical reduction in his article “A Unified Theory of Thought, Meaning and Action”. Because knowing is always a reduction (Davidson), nothing can be known by itself in itself.

The great philosophers at the turning point of human history established an idea of *Universitas* as a basis of their philosophy, human thought and educational theory. The idea of university was developed by Plato and Aristotle in Antiquity, by Aquinas in the Middle Ages, and by Kant in Modernity. They all have almost one voice about the idea. We may briefly glance at them. For example, in the theory of Plato's Academy (*Academeia*), as can be seen from the Table 2, there is a relation between having the general truth of all "scientific" fields and having an integrated spirit and body. This is the most general level of the idea of university, which can be seen in all the philosophers that will be mentioned here. Creative thinking starts from erotic desire, directs itself towards the idea of beauty, and transforms to the wisdom of the idea of good and knowledge of being; the *Logistikon* of *Psykhé* achieves harmony with *Epithymetikon* and *Thimoeides* (as judgement was created a teleological unity between theoretical and practical reason in favour of goodness in Kant). *Dianoia* is connected to *Noesis* by *Dialektika* (as understanding was connected to the pure ideas of reason in Kant), *Hypothesis* is connected to the *Eide*, and finally one reaches his/her personal integration and happiness (*Daimonia*) by gathering the general scientific, philosophical truth. The academic duty of philosophy is to determine and define all these fields through their related ideas and the idea of good. *Academeia* was free of charge, and served as an enlightening higher educational institution (Nails, 2002: 248). The idea of creation of a human being him/herself in an intellectual perfection is just the idea of *Universitas* as can be read as a turn from Hesiod's' *Theogonia* to Plato's *Anthropogonia*².

Table 2. The academic fields and the theory of participation in Plato³

Beings	NOETA (Known by reason)		AISTHETA (Percept by sense)	
Places of beings	Sun- <i>Psykhé</i> (Soul)		Earth-Body	
Psychic domains	<i>Logistikon</i> (reasoning)		<i>Thimoeides</i> (<i>animus</i> , animation, <i>elan vital</i>)	<i>Epithymetikon</i> (desire- needs)
Known objects	<i>Eide</i> (ideas, principles)	<i>Hypothesis</i>	<i>Zoa</i> (animals), <i>skeuata</i> (productions)	<i>Eikasia</i> (signs)
Types of knowledge	<i>Episteme</i> (<i>dialektika</i> , philosophical knowledge)	<i>Teleute</i> (Knowledge of sciences)	<i>Gnosis</i> (bliefs), <i>alethes doksa</i> (true opinion)	<i>Aisthesis</i> (sense, imagination), <i>doksa</i> (opinion)
Ways of knowing	<i>Noesis</i> (abstract reason – grasping by <i>Nous</i>)	<i>Dianoia</i> (intentional inference)	<i>Pistis</i> (believing)	<i>Eikasia</i> (guess, design)
Fields of knowledge	Arithmetic (Philosophy) (normative sciences)	Geometry: (positive sciences)	Music, rhetoric, gymnastic, vb. (Applied sciences)	

² It's quite remarkable to discover that, the beginning of the systematic philosophy with Meno's *aporia* in Plato is based on a Russell paradox: A set of idea (man) takes itself as its own member so as to recreate itself.

³ Plato (1997) himself verbally draws this table in his *Republic* VI, 509e (p. 1130). "Psychic domain" has also taken by the same way from *Republic* IV, 423a- 445e (p. 1055-1077).

His student, Aristotle, also has almost the same idea in his *Lykeion*. But he reduces the idea of being to the knowability of being, which is dependent on the rational part of *Psykhé* (see. Table 3). This transition is on the one hand the precursor of Kant's Copernican revolution, and on the other hand it emphasises more strongly the relation between having an idea of general truth and having an integrated personality with harmonious faculties. Thinking (*Dianoia*) is a part of the virtues as "*Dianoethikes Aretes*". His idea of *Universitas* or totality, namely *prote philosophia*, is the cumulative totality of the principles or ideas of the fields, from simple and less to complex and more. First of all, soul is the "[final] cause and origin of the living body (...) all are means to the soul as end" (Aristotle, 2008: p. 46) (para. 423b). In the soul, three logical principles of *Nous* (pure theoretical reason) are applied on genus-species relations within an *apodeictical syllogismos*, and we get scientific knowledge, *episteme*. *Nous* is also applied to contingent knowledge that needs to be decided on by the help of *Nous Practicos* or *Phronesis* and *Techné*. The purpose or *telos* of *Phronesis* is itself beauty of action or decision connecting the universal and the singular, namely virtue. Therefore, soul realises itself as a unified end in itself by being virtuous. Decision faculty or judgement (as Kant has named) is *Proairesis* that manage *Phronesis* and *Techné*. *Techné* is not effective only on some creative art pieces that did not exist before, but also on the objects of the other faculties of the soul; namely all of the theoretical and practical wisdom, and scientific knowledge are the end or *telos* of *Techné*.⁴ Finally, *Psykhé* is a *Universitas* of its faculties, and all the scientific and educative practices are based on this idea. The completion of the distinctive faculties of the species is an intellectual end in itself for human being.

Table 3. Academic fields and the classification of faculties in Aristotle

		<i>Psykhé</i> (Soul)			
Parts of Soul	Noetike Rational	Irrational			
		Aisthetike Animal		Threptike Vegetal	
Psychic domains	Cognition	Oreksis Desire		Addiction to needs	
Virtues	<i>Dianoethikes aretes</i> -intellectual virtues			<i>Ethikes Aretes</i> -Ethical virtues	
Types of knowledge	<i>Genos</i> , cins ile ilgili, necessary knowledge	<i>Symbebekos</i> , ilinekle ilgili, contingent knowledge		<i>Gnorimon</i> -tacit habitual knowledge	
Types of <i>Dianoia</i> , thinking	<i>Theoretika</i>		<i>Praktike</i>	<i>Poietike</i> (Creative)	
Ways of knowing	<i>Sophia</i>		<i>Phronesis</i>	<i>Techné</i>	
	<i>Nous</i> Reason	<i>Episteme</i>	Practical wisdom		
Fields of knowledge	Philosophy, Logic	Science	Politics, ethics, economy	Arts	

⁴ See Aristotle. (1998). *HΘΙΚΑ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΑ*. (p. 115) (para. 1139 a21- 1139b 5).

Medieval universities were first founded on Augustinian neo-Platonic philosophy but they were not able to resist the power of Aristotelian philosophy. The first university was Bologna founded in 1088; the University of Paris followed it in the middle of the 12th century; then Oxford in 1167, Cambridge in 1209, Salamanca in 1218, Padua in 1222, and so on and so forth. At the beginning, they were called *Studium Generale*, but after the 13th century only the ones called *Universitas* were left, as *Universitas magistrorum et scholarium*, *Universitas scholarium* or *Universitas studii* (Rüeg, 2003: 37). Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy started from Paris in 13th century, and became more influential in universities and on the history of European Thought in general, so that if one wishes to negate his ideas even today, he/she still has to use his discourse. He was an Averroist and Aristotelian, and shared the idea of *prote philosophia*. For him, the whole science must have the same object with the essential principles, as far as universal science has been kept in its own principles (Aquinas, 1920: p. 11). Therefore, theology has the same duty as *prote philosophia*: finding out these first principles, and demonstrating their totality or universality. Knowledge starts from the bodily *existentia* of empirical reality—like Aristotle—and rises up towards *Essentia* (see Table 4). The degree of *Universitas* of *Essentia* and *Existentia* exhibits a hierarchical ontological structure. The degree of identity and difference of *ipseidas-quidditas* (*Essentia-Existentia*) determines not only their substantial *realitas* but also their intellectual *realitas* and knowledge. One cannot reach the absolute, pure forms in the Divine Mind (in contrast to Hegel), but one can imagine and talk about them. Individuation of physical matter separates *Essentia* and *Existentia*, and produces existential desires and fears. One may hope for an end according to the degree of his natural law synthesis between his knowledge (of his *essentia*) and his own will (his *existentia*) (like in Kant). The essence of cognition and existence of will differ. But if one activates his *nous pathetikos* or *intellectus possibilis* and links it back to the ideas and principles of active *intellectus* he can reach the common good, natural law, and can achieve integrated personality and happiness. Because mental and sensual pleasures are not different, *Universitas* of knowledge is the same as the *Universitas* of soul. Whole science, *prote philosophia*, is *Theologia* (Aquinas, 1922: 124- 126) (para. I, 80, 2).

Table 4. The degrees of intellectual and substantial realities of beings in Aquinas

	Being	Type of being	Existential position	Mode of motion	Substantial Faculty	Mode
N O E S I S↓	Unity God Father <i>Nous</i>	Absolute Pure Being Forms (Ideas)	<i>Essentia</i> = <i>Ente</i> (<i>Existentia</i>) <i>Universitas</i>	<i>Entellekheia</i> Pure and accomplished action of <i>Nous</i>	<i>Nous</i> (Divine Mind) ↓ ↓ ↓ <i>Intellectus</i>	Necessary Being, First Reason, Autonomy
N O E	(Holy Spirit) ↓ ↓ ↓ <i>Intellectus</i> Intellects	↑More pure beings and forms ↓↓↓ Material forms	<i>Essentia</i> ≈ <i>Existentia</i>	<i>Entelekheia</i> + ↓ ↓ ↓ <i>Energeia</i>	<i>Intellectus</i> Active Reason ↓ ↓ ↓ Passive Reason <i>Intellectus Possibilis</i> Sense	Contingent beings Their <i>existentia</i> has been determined by
T A	Nature (Son, Jesus) Soul (Man)	Composed beings Matter+Form	<i>Essentia</i> ≠ <i>Existentia</i>	<i>Dynameis</i>	↓ ↓ ↓ Sense, Desire Body, needs	an external <i>essentia</i> Heteronomy

The relation between the philosophy of *Universitas* and the university institution is not so clear in Aquinas' texts. But McIntyre (2009) says that it can be seen if we compare Paris and Oxford by considering Aquinas' *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics* (VI, Lect. VII, 1209-1211). The education of *septem artes liberales* starts with *Trivium*: logic/dialectica, grammar and rhetoric. The study goes from logic to mathematics, and then to *Quadrivium*: arithmetic, astronomy, music, geometry and ethics. If the student was successful in his active teaching, and could achieve maturity, then he would pass metaphysics and theology. The maturation of a student requires a philosophy of *Universitas* of soul, *Universitas* of syllabus, namely anthropological and ontological *Universitas* and active help (faith and hope goes with love). McIntyre also supports Aquinas' idea of natural law as corresponding with *Universitas*: "We are able to understand what the university should be, only if we understand what the universe is" (p. 94-95).

There is almost nothing left for Kant. The specific great success of Kant's philosophy is his system of categories. Like the Copernican revolution, he reversed the theoretical positions of the sensible and intelligible worlds. The external reality that had been expressed as *aisthetike* in antiquity, as *existentia* in the medieval era, and as *res extensa* in the beginning of modernity by Descartes, was expressed as *mundus intelligibilis* in Latin, and named as *noumenon* in Greek by Kant. Additionally, the internal mental processes that had been expressed as *noetike* in the antiquity, as *essentia* in the medieval era, and as *res cogitans* in the beginning of modernity by Descartes, was expressed as *mundus sensibilis* in Latin, and named as *phainomenon* in Greek by Kant. This epistemological reverse helped to overcome the most profound theoretical mistake of the previous ontologies: fetishist reasoning. Fetishism offers the mediate one as an immediate, so the symbols have the power of reality. But the appeared world we sensually live in is a cognitively mediated world. We do not have any knowledge of the rest: All the ideas of the ontological reality and any ethical principles of human nature are reachable by tools of reasoning. Kant puts these two worlds in methodological relation in his system. In the two cognitive faculties, "reason" deals with human nature, desires and freedom, while "understanding" deals with the cognition of the nature. They will be tied up by the third cognitive faculty, "judgement", in an art of action in real life according to subjective pleasure that should be generally valid (see Table 5). The definitions, relations and the meaning of the totality of cognitive faculties are almost the same as *nous*, *episteme*, *phronesis* and *techné* in Aristotle.

Table 5. The faculties of the mind in Kant

All the faculties of the mind	Faculty of cognition	<i>A priori</i> principles	Application to
Faculty of cognition	Understanding	Lawfulness	Nature
Feeling of pleasure and displeasure	Power of judgement	Purposiveness	Art
Faculty of desire	Reason	Final end	Freedom

Source: Kant, I. (2001). *Critique of the Power of Judgement*, p. 85, (para. 5. 198)

Kant's philosophy is based on a transcendental logic, which deals with some logical *a priori* possibilities over general Aristotelian logic that has ontological applications on genus-species. The epistemological possibilities of the other faculties are determined according to the *a priori* principles of understanding. Ontology has been reduced to the cognitive faculties of *Psykhé*, like in Aristotle, and in parallel with this, understanding is the limit of knowledge like in Aquinas. We cannot have a substantial reason because we have no perfect *nous*, or absolute totality of *essentia* and *existentia*, or knowledge and will. *Universitas* is one of the *a priori* principles of understanding, and not a result of something called "reason". On the contrary, reason is an organisational result of the *Universitas* of the power of judgement, which collects the purposes of understanding and reason under its purposiveness principle (Kant, 2000: 683) (para. B845). The final ontological purpose of looking for the perfectness or *Vollkommenheit* (Kant, 1974: 40) of *Universitas* of cognition is "autonomy" of reason, which separates human beings from the other animals. A deficient human being naturally desires to be completed by knowledge. "Autonomy", the metaphysical principle of morals is "*the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature*" (Kant, 1964: 103) (para. 79). This highest purpose of reason is the highest good: the combination of the moral law "categorical imperative" and natural laws of nature, with the *Universitas* of *Psykhé* and the dignity of individuals, society and the whole human civilisation. (Kant, 2000: 680) (para. A810/B838).

The *Universitas* of the cognitive faculties also means the *Universitas* of faculties for the branches of sciences at a university. The power of judgement of a university organises the sciences according to the essential purposes of reason, constructive *a priori* principles, and the idea of each science, just as with judgement's organising understanding according to reason. Otherwise, the sciences will try to organise themselves according to their school tradition, then this order would be a "scholastic rhapsody", "speculation on images" and a "blind technique". Metaphysics, in the sense of Aristotle's *prote philosophia*, as the unity of the principles of sciences, ties up the targets of the scientific branches within a methodology under the architectonical unity of pure reason. This project gives us the exact idea of university, within which the *Universitas* of faculties was ordered by the autonomy of reason. "*Denn dadurch wird man in den Stand gesetzt, das Ganze zu übersehen, die Hauptpunkte, worauf es bei dieser Wissenschaft ankommt, stückweise zu prüfen, und manches dem Vortrage nach*

besser einzurichten, als es in der ersten Ausfertigung des Werks geschehen konnte”⁵ (Kant, 1983: 12) (para. A20). In parallel with this reason, Kant offers the divisions of the branches of philosophy and science:

Table 6. The division of the faculty of philosophy or the architectonic of pure reason⁶

PHILOSOPHY					
Pure Philosophy (Over historical, logical knowledge, pure mathematics and philosophy)					Empirical Philosophy
Metaphysics (The whole scientific system of pure reason)				Critical Philosophy	(Historical knowledge
(Theoretical) Metaphysics of Nature			(Practical) Metaphysics of Morals	Investigating the faculty of reason in regard to all <i>a priori</i> cognition	: history, geography, philology, humanities, social-natural sciences; all empirical sciences)
Physiology		Transcendental Philosophy (1.Ontoloji)			
2.Rational Physiology	3.Rational Cosmology	4.Rational Theology	(Autonomy)		

For Kant this is a strict division, and one must find a serious criticism to change it. If the faculties of a university are not directed under the autonomy of philosophy, which means the autonomy of reason, people would be under the illusion of ideas of pure reason, the illusions of ideology, economics, mores, religion or democratic consensus, so that they cannot see what they should hope for as the end of their actions. In his time, theology, law and medicine were the higher faculties, and philosophy was the lower faculty in Prussia. His *The Conflict of Faculties* basically rejects and reverses this order. All education and research activities in a university are based on the public use of reason, and university needs autonomy for the sake of truth. Something cannot be accepted as true for the sake of a political consensus, etc. (Kant, 1992: p. 43). Therefore, a rational theoretical plan is necessary, instead of a contingent and irrational one. The autonomy of a university is not based on the political autonomy of the rector or the administration, but based on the scientific or philosophical authority of masters in their respective operational fields. A university can attain autonomy by ensuring the use of critical reflection of public reason. The autonomy of university returns to the society in the enlightenment of the nation. The result of the university ensuring the use of critical reflection of public reason is *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment: "Have the courage to use your own reason [Verstand]"* (Kant, 1968: 35).

⁵ Then, one gets a Stand to be able to grasp the Whole, to examine one by one the key Points in this Science, and to arrange some things better regarding their Exposition than that could be their first Execution of the Work.

⁶ See: Kant, I. (2000). *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 691-701 (para. A832-851/B860-879).

From Plato's idea of Good as an *anthropogonia*, Aristotle's *Prote philosophia*, to Aquinas' natural law as *summun bonum*, these all are expressed in Kant's idea of metaphysics as an idea of *Universitas*. *Universitas*, the *a priori* principle of understanding, becomes a categorical principle for the idea of university, which targets autonomy as the metaphysical principle of morals and also politics or any super structure of a society and the university institution. Even though Kant or the other philosophers don't give the concept *Universitas* as a principle of the idea of university, it is very clear in a general picture of their texts as we have briefly exhibited. *Universitas*, that we have asserted here as the categorical principle of the idea of university, is the main distinctive norm of the university institution, which it "ought to" have. An institution called "university" without this norm *Universitas* is not a university at all. Kant exhibited an error theory of his idea of university in *The Conflict*. Now we have a distinctive norm for university that we have gathered from the history of philosophy, and we have to prove it within an error theory. But a norm is not knowledge that we can demonstrate through a proof. This is the problem of the final section.

3. How to ground a norm by reasoning

The idea of *Universitas* or the wholeness of the sciences has been rejected several times. The rejections are mistakes, and there are two reasons for these mistakes. First, they mix up "transcendent" and "transcendental", and cannot appreciate the transcendental position of *Universitas*. Second, they base their rejections on Hegel's idea of *Universitas*, which is not transcendental at all. Even the great scholastic master Thomas Aquinas separates the idea of absolute wholeness from understanding and knowledge, Hegel asserts an immanent totality of sciences with all of its contents. His objective idealism is the expression of this. Even Hegel considers himself an Aristotelian rather than a Platonist because Aristotle considered idea as ἐνέργεια rather than δόναμις. But Aristotle's *in Re* position in the problem of universals has some materialistic meaning rather than objective idealism.

The basic, correct negation of the idea of Hegelian wholeness came from Russell in the **analytic** tradition. The idea of the solid and indivisible unity of the universe is the source of philosophical monism and religious pantheism, and this decorated logic is based on some visible, technical mistakes (Russell, 1999: 121). **Pragmatist** negation of the idea of wholeness is based upon Dewey's ideas: the philosophers before him have made human nature dependent on some unnatural, essentialist principles, like natural law or the categorical imperative. They all are an obstacle for human freedom. Freedom comes from participating in the natural determinism (Dewey, 1995: 65-80). This is another example of misunderstanding Kant. Kant's categorical imperative is a transcendental principle, and has no content or essence. Additionally, this pragmatist sense of freedom makes human beings heteronomous rather than autonomous; it is a kind of animal morality that has no idea of *Universitas* between identity and difference, it is only self-identification or affirmation. Quine also rejects the idea of *Universitas* between reality and ideas by rejecting the Aristotelian truth principle "coherence" in logic: "*Bodily states exist anyway; why add the others?*" (Quine, 1960: 264), like truth or *Universitas*. His idea of "holism" expresses the plurality of scientific data alongside

each other without logical connection. Popper accuses Quine at this moment of being sceptical (Popper, 1972: 311). Coherence is the beginning of cognition, and a certain degree of reduction is needed. Otherwise, theoretical understanding, the theoretical reduction of biology to physics, mechanics to electrodynamics, or the other way around would be impossible. “*Then we might speak of life as an emergent property of physical bodies, or of matter*”, and then to know something would theoretically be impossible (Popper, 1972: 291-292). **Postmodernism**, as the European voice of pragmatism, basically leans on the rejection of the idea of *Universitas*. Lyotard’s *The Postmodern Condition*, which was considered as the Bible of postmodernism, simply centred on the rejection of Kantian and Aristotelian *Prote philosophia*. For him, the legitimacy of knowledge and university is not based on some higher ideas that carry human beings to freedom, but is pragmatically based on the meeting of the interests of its society. Additionally it is a part of a language game and politics (Lyotard, 1984: 66). In parallel to all these, Adorno can be taken as a best example from **Marxism**. He clearly and consciously rejects the immanent principle of *Universitas*: “*If it [The Hegelian immanent dialectics] became totally conclusive, dialectics would be the totality that goes back to the identity principle*” (Adorno, 1990: 182). “The identity principle” means to give a theoretical order to the practical reality, and this is the business of a transcendent power, namely politics.

Universitas as a transcendental principle is not the object of these negations, and they all are right in their positions, except the pragmatists and especially Quine. This is because Quine deeply rejects the transcendental role of the principle *Universitas* in understanding by asserting the lack of a truth criterion. If there is no coherent truth than there is no knowledge at all. Popper’s position against Quine is indispensable. It is the same with the *Universitas* of all sciences. They are right that it is a political choice or decision. You give a theoretical order to the scientific practices according to either theoretical rationality or political irrationality. Irrational order has an accidental relation with freedom, and produces technology, not science. Today technology and science are mixed up. The norm of the idea of university, *Universitas*, cannot simply be rejected because such wholeness doesn’t really exist. Otherwise we cannot have any norm for ideas, and then, for example, we would have to appreciate cruelty because there is no “justice” in real life, or let ill people die because there is no “health” in nature, and so on. We can’t be sceptical at this moment. At least, a consistent rejection would be a contradiction and irrational.

Those who reject the idea of *Universitas* of sciences could be right if there was not such a thing as *Universitas*. It is not real, but that is why it is a norm. A norm is not knowledge that can be taken back to its object to prove it. But a norm of an idea may be grounded by true reasoning as a proof. Ioanna Kuçuradi (2007), who is one of the pioneers of the doctrine of human rights, does give us a method about how to ground a norm: A norm can be grounded by the logical form of *reductio ad absurdum*, “*under the light of a comparison between at least two different historical states of affairs human beings have faced, [or] under the light of the knowledge of the value of some possibilities of human being (or under the light of what is called human dignity)*” (p. 64).

For the *reductio ad absurdum* inference, the opposite of *Universitas* would be postmodern university, called “multiversity” in principle. These two opposite ideas appear within two different historical states: the Humboldtian modern German research university model and the postmodern American commercial multiversity model. Today, the American university model is in a position to occupy European universities. This is called the “Bologna Process”. If we reach the idea of multiversity as an absurd one, then, we would have the proof of the idea of university. We should then consider what happens without *Universitas*. After the definition of the idea of university with all the descriptions above, we can easily reach some conclusions: the members of a society that has a university without the principle of *Universitas* lose their rational sensitivity because of the lack of a critical reflection that was supposed to be offered to public reason by the university. The lack of this rational principle loosens the connection of the sciences with the categorical imperative or freedom, which results in the lack of human dignity, and the lack of ontological totality of human being in general. The lack of *Universitas* will produce its opposite: fragmentation of psyche or faculties, alienation and an ontological degradation of the human species.

The story of the alienation problem goes back to the Medieval essence-existence distinction, as we have seen in Aquinas. Hegel is the first who gives us the definition of alienation. Finally, we see it in Marx’s *1844 Manuscripts* as a focused and well-defined problem. Man is not only alienated from the product of his labour but also from his species-life, his nature and other men as well (Marx, 1963: 103). Man has technical cognition but has no will to use it, and decisions do not belong to him. This is a fragmentation of human nature. This man is a heteronomous creature that can be controlled externally. The integration of universities with industry is required of such a human nature. Heidegger explains the alienation problem from a totally different angle. Man is in a technical relation with nature. This is a creative, *poiesis* way of thinking, which is called *techné* in Greek. *Techné* is a way of the appearance of truth or *aletheia*. But modern *techné* has been framed by framing nature. So, man loses the connection with truth because his nature has been framed as well (Heidegger 1977: 19). This is a metaphysical explanation of the problem of alienation. Considering the postmodern *techné*, we may call it finance and information technology, which is not framing nature but framing the framing technology of nature. As I have given a definition for years for the basic characteristic of the postmodern era, this is a double alienation of human beings as a species, and indicates a double lack of truth. The postmodern university project is an unmasking of this postmodern *techné*.

From the historical point of view, at first glance, the Bologna Process commenced in 1999 in a declaration by the European Union. The text, *The EU Contribution to the Bologna Process*⁷ expresses as its main target “to make European higher education more compatible and comparable” with other continents (p. 3). The Bologna Process has also been articulated in the Copenhagen Declaration, which regulates the economic conditions of the EU. The remarkable point for this revolution in education is that it has nothing to do with education at all: “The severity of the current economic crisis adds an exceptional degree of unpredictability about the future of the

⁷ http://ec.europa.eu/education/higher-education/doc/bologna09_en.pdf

world's economy, and underlines the need for skills" (p. 4). Even in the text, *Modernisation Agenda for universities*⁸, this revolution is named as "modernisation", and the main target of the Bologna Process is clearly spelled out: "*Modernisation of Europe's universities, (...) has been acknowledged (...) as part of the wider move towards an increasingly global and knowledge-based economy*" (p. 2). Economic globalisation or transnational capital is the new basis and definition of knowledge. The definition of university has also been changed under the title of *Ensure Real Autonomy and Accountability for Universities*: "Real autonomy" means financial autonomy by depending on industry, and political accountability to governments. Obviously, there are some bodies who know exactly the problem they create, and add this weak warning by highlighting it: "*It also requires universities to overcome their fragmentation into faculties, departments, laboratories and administrative units and to target their efforts collectively on institutional priorities for research, teaching and services*" (p. 5-6). We can also find a new definition of human being in the 1999 Bologna Declaration⁹ as the target of the new "European" university system. It points out the adoption of the new system as "*essentially based on two main cycles, undergraduate and graduate. (...) first cycle shall also be relevant to the European labour market as an appropriate level of qualification*". The second has been charged with reproducing the first cycle. The new human species is being adapted to the European labour market with all appropriate level of qualification. The new man and woman is a *homo economicus* who has been updated with some technical knowledge, ranging from medicine to theology.

It is obvious that the Bologna Process is a part of neoliberalist globalisation. Because, as Manuel Castells (2003) has also indicated, the unification of Europe is the reaction to and the most developed expression of the globalisation process (p. 348). Additionally, Jameson (1991) points out that this historical stage is one of the features of postmodernism, and it may even be called "late capitalism", like the name of his book. We all know that the historical background of neoliberal globalisation politics is the 70s' economic crisis and the end of the bi-polar world order. Bourdieu's (1988) well-known definition of the neoliberalist aim is to overcome the collective structures that could be an obstacle to pure market logic (p. 2). Here the university institution with the charge of critical reflection of public reason is a perfect example of a "collective structure". The way of overcoming the collective structures have been defined as "articulation" to the free market (Barone, 1985: 155-157). Therefore, "Bologna" is the articulation "Process" of the university to the neoliberalist globalisation process.

This historical reality is more obvious in Wissema's famous book, *Towards the Third Generation University*. He is an advocate of applying American neoliberalist politics to European universities. For him, the duty of the new university is transforming itself according to the competitive values of economic enterprise. Otherwise, these "semi-autonomous" universities would have to be closed, and the members would be fired (Wissema, 2009: 123). Additionally, the target of education, which would also be the new definition of human being, is equipping students with some enterprising virtues:

⁸ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0208:FIN:EN:PDF>

⁹ http://www.bologna-bergen2005.no/Docs/00-Main_doc/990719BOLOGNA_DECLARATION.PDF

getting people to trust you, developing organisational skills over these people, and enterprising courage (Wissema, 2009: p. 196). Briefly, the Aristotelian virtues in contrast to the core of them: taking human being as means, instead of as ends in themselves.

Generally, either the official texts of the EU or Wissema's book seem so frivolous, in a comparison with the philosophical ideas of university we have discussed above. They take science as technology, and reduce it to industry and the market, and reduce human faculties to an engineering logic as "applied theory". None of the ideas of the new university have an answer to the question "what is human" and "what is the idea of university". They have no serious university theory at all, and not even an error theory that we can see when their "university" would not be a university in reality. That is why we have evaluated them within their historical positions in neoliberalism and postmodernism, and tailored a theoretical basis for them.

Nonetheless, there is a historical factum of fifty years in America that we could use as the evidence. They call their idea a "multiversity", which directly refuses the principle *Universitas*. The defenders of multiversity all blamed the lack of results on this principle, and they are theoretically blind to the central role of the principle *Universitas*. Here is a list of what they themselves warned us about the absurd results of their idea of multiversity. For Fallis (2007), from York University, multiversity is important for the commercial Anglo-American universities in preparing for the next century of the World (p. 5). But this new structure of university is alarming for the humanities, which were the basis of the essence of the modern universities (p. 10). And unfortunately, the democratic function of the multiversity would decline in post-industrial society (p. 13). Continuously, he lists the problems of commercialisation: "*the increasingly utilitarian, job-oriented attitudes of students, rising of tuition fees, the pressures on professors to seek external grants and contracts, the use of business terminology and business methods in academic administration, the increasing emphasis on marketing as the university represents itself*" (260). Bowie (1990), from Minnesota University, who defends the university-industry partnership, complains about some of its results: the *differentia specifica* of science as "theory for theory" is transformed into "theory for profit", the lack of personal integrity in the students, and the alienation, the lack of qualified education, the lack of equal opportunity in education due to the turn from human values to commercial values (p. 209). Scott (1990) the well-known educationalist from Kinston University, points out the logical turn that pragmatist multiversity creates: "*the movement towards utilitarianism and away from coherence [the Aristotelian theory of truth], characteristic of modern systems of higher education*" (p. 132). Wilshire (1990), from Rutgers University, both defends pragmatist multiversity, and blames it for the lack of personal integrity in students (p. 11), and its weak connection with truth (p. 17). In fact, they all complain of the lack of the autonomy of reason, the lack of autonomy of the university against their society, the lack of the importance of basic research fields in the natural and social sciences because of the lack of the truth principle that gives an order to the faculties. They are not aware what they are complaining about, these all are the effects of the lack of the principle of *Universitas*.

Finally, here is our result of reasoning: if we accept that the lack of *Universitas* is absurd as a result of all these theoretical and historical evaluations, then we have grounded the principle *Universitas* as the basic norm of the university. There is a philosophical tradition of thousands of years behind this principle, which we have simply made more apparent here. As Habermas pointed out in his article “*The Idea of University*”, this is a part of a language game: if there is not a public understanding of this idea then this principle is meaningless. But if anyone is against the effects of the lack of the principle *Universitas* behind the idea of modern university, they necessarily have to accept this philosophical, ethical, ontological and epistemological principle. We should consider that this logical result is not an abstract idea if we see the binding effects of the idea of truth. The result of the lack of *Universitas* we have shown here is profoundly dangerous for the sustainability of the human species as a species of rational beings. We have to maintain human dignity, social honour, public reason, free will, the autonomy of reason, science and academic personality against the totalitarian plutocracy of the economically and politically elite utilitarian class in “democracy”.

Universite Düşüncesinin Ontolojik İlkesi ve Mantıksal Sınırları

Özet

Tarihte ilk kez Sümerler, M.Ö. 4000'lerden itibaren "üniversite" kavramına uyan bir yüksek eğitim sistemi kurmuşlardır. Bu sistem kendilerinden sonra binlerce yıl daha Ortadoğu'da varlığını sürdürmeye devam etti. Eski Hindistan ve Çin'de üniversite kavramımıza uyan yüksekokulların da olduğunu biliyoruz. Platon'un *Akadeimeia*'sı ve Aristotelesin *Lykeion*'u ise bildiğimiz anlamda akademik içeriğin olduğu ve üniversite kavrayışının yerleştiği ilk kurumlardır. Bütünlüklü sistematik felsefeyi bir yüksekokulda başlatmalarıyla bir ön-üniversite modelinin de *Akadeimeia* ve *Lykeion*'da başlamış olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Planlanmış bir ders programı ve akademik unvanlarla bir hiyerarşinin hukuka bağlanması da eklenince medreselerin ardından ilk Ortaçağ üniversiteleriyle karşılaşırız. Üniversiteleri medreselerden ayıran tek şey kendi siyasal tarihlerine özgü yapılaşmaları, papalık ve krallık güçlerinin evrensellik beklentisi, teorik olarak meşruluklarının ve egemenliklerinin evrensel düzeyde kesinleştirilmesi isteğidir. İlk üniversiteler 1088 yılında Bologna üniversitesi ile paralı öğrenci dernekleri şeklinde başlamış, krallıkların öncülüğünde kurulmuş ve papalık tarafından eğitim sistemleri yapılandırılmış olsa da gene papalığın öncülüğünde kendi bağımsız hukuklarını ilan ettikleri de bir gerçektir. Ortaçağ üniversitelerine Aristoteles ve Thomas Aquinas damgasını vurmuştur.

Üniversite düşüncesinin felsefi bir problematik olarak ele alındığı dikkat çekici ilk metin 1789 da Kantın yayımladığı "Fakülteler Çatışması"dır. Kantın düşünceleri doğrultusunda ilk modern araştırma üniversiteleri Von Humboldt ve Schleiermacher'ın öncülüğünde 1810'da Berlin Üniversitesiyle kurulmaya başlanır. İkinci metin 1852'de Cardinal Newman tarafından "The idea of a University", "Üniversite Düşüncesi" başlığıyla yayımlanır. Ardından Karl Jaspers 1923 ve 1946 yıllarında aynı başlıkla makalesini yayımlar. Son metin 1987'de, önceki metinlere gönderim yapmak için aynı başlıkla Jürgen Habermas tarafından yayımlanır. Habermas Üniversite konusunun idealist bakış açısının bir konusuymuş gibi bir "ide" olarak ele alınmasına karşı çıkmakta ve konuyu Schleiermacher ve Wittgenstein gibi, bir dil oyunu şeklinde ele almaktadır. Yani üniversite düşüncesinin kendisinde kabul edilecek zorunlu bir yan yoktur, siyasal bir karardır. Ancak bir toplum o düşünceyi anlamlı bir iletişim içinde paylaşırsa, "yaşam dünyası" ile üniversite kurumu arasında uygun bir ilişki kurulursa, o zaman üniversite bir evrensellik ve genel bir bilimsel nitelik kazanabilir. Habermas sonunda konunun hafife alnamayacak kadar zor ve karmaşık bir konu olduğunu belirterek tartışmasını kapatır.

Mantıksal olarak bakarsak, Habermas'ın materyalist itirazı doğrudur. Fakat iddiasının materyalizm veya idealizmle bir ilgisi yok. Yani bir üniversite idesi ileri sürmek idealist olmak demek değildir ve Habermas'ın mantıksal itirazı önceki filozoflarca da onaylanacak bir konumdur. Çünkü bir ide, düşünce bir bilgi değildir. Bir bilgi veya ontolojik bir önerme, genel mantıkta, cins-tür ilişkisi içinde, kendiliğinden zorunlu veya koşulsuz olarak doğru değildir. Bilgi olabilmesi için doğal nedensellik ilişkisinde koşullu, hipotetik bir yargı verebilmeli ve nesnesine geri götürülüp kanıtlanabilecek şekilde, "dır" biçiminde yalın, asserterik bir önerme olabilmelidir. Oysa bir düşüncenin, idenin

kanıtlanacağı nesnesi yoktur, doğal nedensellik koşullarına bağlı değildir, ancak onun kendi iç kavramsal, işlem - kaplam bütünlüğü ile ilişkisi içinde, “meli” biçiminde bir gerekliliğinden söz edebiliriz. Fakat işte kırılım noktası da buradadır:

Bütün bunlara rağmen, ancak ve ancak, öncülleri doğru, bilimsel bilgilerle dayandırılabilir ve onlardan doğru bir çıkarımla o sonuç veya ide elde edilebiliyorsa, o ide akli başında bir insan topluluğu tarafından uzlaşım, koşulsuz, kategorik bir yargı ile, zorunlu, apodiktik doğru olarak kabul edilebilir.

İdelerin bu şekilde, gereklilik bildiren bir norm ile temellendirilmesi yapılmadan bir anlamı yoktur, çünkü teorik değil, pratiğe dönüktürler. Pratikteki işlevi insan olmanın ayırıcı özellikleri gereği zorunlu olabilir. Hukuksal, tıbbi, etik, çok çeşitli normlar olabilir ve her biri insanın sağlığı, toplumsal varoluşu, insanlık onuru, yaşaması hatta insanca ölmesi için bile vazgeçilmez niteliktedir. Bu durumda onu, sadece bir düşünce, gerçekte karşılığı olmayan boş bir düşünce diye hafife alamaz veya yok sayamazsınız. 19. ve 20. yy, skeptisizmde temellenen bu tür hatalarla doludur. Hume’un, nedensellik gibi, analitik görünen yargıların aslında psikolojik, yani sentetik önermeler olduğunu göstermesiyle başlayan olgu-değer ayrımı sonunda bizi Ayer ve Strawson’ın emotivizmine götürmüş, gereklilik bildiren ifadelerin duygusal, anlamsız, yani bilim dışı olduğu vurgulanmıştır. Değerlerin olgusal olmadığını söylemekle değerleri olumsuzlamış olmaktadır ki, bu, skeptik bir çelişki doğurur: “değerler olgulardan, yani olması gerekenler olanlardan çıkartılamayacaksa olgusal gerçekliği olmayan değerler de geçersizdir”. Böylece olmayanda temellendirilen ve olmaması gerekeni bildiren olumsuz bir norm üretmiş olurlar ki, bu bir çelişkidir. Sonunda ayrımın kendisi bilimsel bir değer konumuna girer ki, bu da ikinci bir çelişkidir. Olgu ile değer arasında ilişkinin koparılması, “dır”dan “meli”nin çıkartılamayacağı düşüncesi aşırıya kaçmış skeptik bir yanılgıdır. Aksi halde gerçekte sağlık diye bir şey yok diye bütün hastaları ölüme terk eder, adalet diye bir şey yok diye güçlünün acımasız zulmünü sanatsal bulup takdir ederdik.

Skeptisizm aşırıya çekilmedikçe haklıdır, olgu ve değerler birbirinden ayrılabilir mi yoksa kendini bilim gibi sunan çarpık dinsel şarlatanlıkların, tarihsel, rasgele yığılmış kültürel değerler çöplüğünün içinde boğuluruz. Bunu önlemenin yolu kestirip atmak değildir. Bu pire için yorgan yakmaya benzer. Oysa olgular ile değerler doğru bir çözümleme ile ilişkilendirilebilirler. Antropolojik felsefe açısından baktığımızda, bütün felsefe tarihinin tamamen bu konu, olgu-değer ilişkisi üzerine kurulu olduğunu görürüz. Filozofun işi, içindeki temel üst kurumları ile uygarlığı mantıksal olarak doğru tanımlamak ve temellendirebilmektir. Bütün bu düşünceler, doğruluk, sağlık, adalet, üniversite, devlet, hepsi birer idedir ve o halde neye göre temellendirilebilirler? İşte bu cevap önemlidir: insana göre! İnsan tanımına göre ancak diğer tanımlar temellendirilebilirler. Bu yüzden felsefenin temelinde bir insan felsefesine dayalı ontoloji olması, antropolojik bir ontoloji, Betül Çotuksöken’in adlandırmasıyla “antropontoloji” olması gerekir. Kant’ın üç kitapta topladığı üçlemesinin, “Ne bilebilirim?”, “Ne yapmalıyım?”, “Ne umabilirim?” sorularının toplam cevabının sonunda “İnsan nedir?” sorusuna bir cevap olmaya göre planlanmasını hatırlayalım. Bütün adımı andığımız büyük filozoflarda temel budur ve diğer üst kurumlar gibi, üniversite düşüncelerini de bu temel üzerine oturtmuşlardır. Felsefe geleneği içinde bu üçlemenin dağılımı basitçe şu tabloyla sergilenebilir:

Tablo 1. Felsefede insanı tanımlayan üç yeti alanının dağılımı

Biyolojik kökeni	Türsel kalıtsal veriler	Yaşama içgüdü	Örgütlenme (organizasyon) biçimleri
İnsandaki yeti	Bilme	İsteme	Eylem (istenç)
Nesnesi	Anlam	Değer	Erek
Felsefi teorisi	Anlam teorisi	Değerbilim (aksiyoloji)	Karar teorisi
Mantıkta önerme türü	Anlam önermeleri	Hiyerarşik değerlendirme önermeleri	Eylem önermeleri
Disiplinleri	Bilim	Ahlak	Sanat
Kant'ın sorusu	Ne bilebilirim	Ne yapmalıyım	Ne umabilirim
Bir yetiye indirgeyenler (kabaca)	<i>Bilmeye indirgeyenler:</i> Parmenides, Sokrates, Aristoteles, Kant	<i>İstemeye indirgeyenler:</i> Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bergson	<i>Eyleme indirgeyenler:</i> Herakleitos, Hegel, Marx, James-Dewey

Kimi filozoflar bu üçlemeyi koruyarak diğerlerini bir yetiye indirgerken, bazı filozoflar da yetileri ilişkilendirmeyi ve diğerlerini birine indirgemeyi reddetmiştir. Örneğin Deweyci pragmatik gelenek anlam, değer ve karar alanlarını üç ayrı teori ile inceler. Bu indirgememenin aklın araçsallaştırılması ve kapitalist ekonomi modeliyle bir ilgisi vardır elbette. Çünkü yetilerin parçalanması yabancılaşmaya, heteronomiye neden olur ve kitleleri dışarıdan yönetmeyi sağlar. Gene de örneğin, Donald Davidson “A Unified Theory of Thought, Meaning and Action” adlı makalesinde en azından mantıksal bir indirgeme olanağı denemiştir. Şimdi uygarlık tarihin büyük dönüşümlerine damgasını vuran bu filozofların düşüncelerini birer tablo eşliğinde kısaca görelim:

Tablo 2. Platon'da akademik bilgi alanları ve idealardan pay alma teorisi

Varlık alanı	Güneş-Psykhé (ruh)		Toprak-Beden	
Ruhsal yanı	<i>Logistikon</i> (akıl yürüterek bilme)		<i>Thymoeides</i> (animus, canlılık, yaşam gücü)	<i>Epithymetikon</i> (gereklilikleri arzu etme)
Bilgi türü	<i>Episteme</i> (dialektika, felsefe bilgisi)	<i>Teleute</i> (bilimlerin bilgisi)	<i>Gnosis</i> (inanılan), <i>alethes doksa</i> (doğru sanı)	<i>Aisthesis</i> (duyum, imgelem), <i>doksa</i> (sanı)
Bilme türü	<i>Noesis</i> (soyut akıl -nous- ile kavrama)	<i>Dianoia</i> (yönelimsel, gidimli çıkarım)	<i>Pistis</i> (inanç)	<i>Eikasia</i> (tahmin, tasarımlar)
Bilgi alanı	Aritmetik (Felsefe) (normatif bilimler)	Geometri (pozitif bilimler)	Müzik, retorik, jimnastik, vb. (uygulamalı bilimler)	

Ünlü mağara metaforunu hatırlayalım. Erotik bir sıçrama ile öğrenci ideaların bilgisine ulaşır ve yavaş yavaş o bilgiyi sindirir. Bilgi türleri satırına bakarsak, *doksalardan alethes doksalara*, oradan bilimsel *teleute* ve *epistemeye* yükselen bir

süreç yoktur. Bütünün, en genel tümeller olan ideaların bilgisine ermekle bütün alt bilgiler doğrultulmaktadır. İdelere yükselmek *psykhéde* bir bütünleşme, tamamlanma halidir ve akademik bilgi alanları da bütün sistematik ilişkileri içinde anlam kazanıp yerlerini bulurlar: Aritmetik türü saf felsefi bilgi; olguya teorik bakabilen, ara bilim olarak geometrik mantıkla işleyen bilimler ve uygulamalı bilimler, teknikler bir genel bütünlük oluşturmaktadırlar. *Akademia*'nın en genel kursu “iyi üzerine” adındaydı ve iyilik altında bu bütünlüğün nasıl varlık kazandığı anlatılırdı. Şimdi bir de Aristoteles’in konumunu görelim:

Tablo 3. Aristoteles’te yetiler sınıflandırması ve bilgi alanları

Etkinlik alanı	<i>Psykhé</i> (ruh)				
Ruhsal yetiler	Bilme			Oreksis-İsteme	Bağımlılık
Erdemler	<i>Dianoethikes aretes</i> (düşünsel erdemler)			<i>Ethikes aretes</i> (etik erdemler)	
<i>Dianoia</i> türü	<i>Theoretika</i>	<i>Praktike</i>	<i>Poietike</i> (yaratıcı)		
Bilme yetileri	<i>Sophia</i>		<i>Phronesis</i>	<i>Tekhné</i>	
	<i>Nous</i>	<i>Episteme</i>			
Bilgi alanı	Felsefe mantık	Bilim	Siyaset, etik, iktisat	Sanat	

Bu tabloda en önemli konu varlığın insana ve bilmeye indirgenmiş olmasıdır. *Metafizik*'inin ilk tümcesi bu düşünce ile başlar: “*Tüm insanlar doğal olarak bilmek ister*” (πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει) [980a][21]. Aristoteles Platon’un varlığı kendinde bir bütünlük olarak aldığı için *Menon* diyalogundaki açmaza düştüğünü, varlığın ancak cins-tür ilişkisine sokularak bilinebileceğini vurgular. Ve erdemleri de etik ve *dianoetik*, düşünsel erdemler olarak ikiye ayırarak açmazı çözer. Fakat bizim için temel aynıdır: İnsanın ruhsal, ontolojik bütünlüğü demek bilgi ve bilimlerin bütünlüğü demektir. Düşünme türleri olan *theoretika*, *praktike* ve *poietike*, aynen Kant’taki teorik akıl, pratik akıl ve yargı gücü ilişkisindedir. İnsanın bilme yetilerinin bütünlenmesi için artık aşağıdan başlayarak, *episteme*, *phronesis*, *tekhne*, veya bilme, isteme, yaratıcı karar-eylem yetilerinde deneme yanılma ile olgunlaşarak *nous*’un, aklın saf bilgisine ulaşılabilir. Bilimler en basit ve saf olandan en karmaşık olana doğru öncekinin ilkeleri üzerinde temellenirler. Mantık + ontoloji + ahlak + siyaset. Siyaset eğitime karar verdiği için diğer bilimlerin üstünde bir yere sahiptir. Ve eğitimle bu bütünlüğü, eğitimin üreteceği insan bütünlüğünü ve insan bütünlüğüne giden yol olarak *prote philosophiayı* yani bilimlerin ilkesel bütünlüğünü tamamlamak olanaklıdır. Bilmenin ilkesel bütünlüğü aracılığı ile insanın ontolojik bütünlüğe ulaşması ve tür olarak insan olmayı gerçekleştirmesi düşüncesi Ortaçağda başlayacak üniversite kurumunun arkasındaki temel felsefi düşüncedir. Aquinas da genel olarak Aristoteles’in izinden gider, fakat Yeni-Platoncu, dinsel yorumlarla:

Tablo 4. Aquinas'ta tözsel yetilerin varlık, bilgi ve oluş olanakları

Varlık	Varlık tarzının durumu	Hareket tarzı	Tözsel yetiler	Varlık kipi
Birlik Tanrı Baba <i>Nous</i>	Öz = Varlık (<i>Essentia = Ente</i>) <i>Universitas</i>	<i>Entellekheia</i> <i>Nous</i> 'un eylemsiz saf etkinliği, tamamlanmış bütünlük	<i>Nous</i> (Tanrısal Zihin) ↓ ↓ ↓ <i>Intellectus</i>	Zorunlu Varlık İlk Neden Özerk
(Kutsal Ruh) ↓ ↓ ↓ <i>Intellectus</i> Akıllar	Öz ≈ Varlık	Saf etkin <i>Entellekheia</i> + ↓ ↓ ↓ Eylem <i>Energiea</i>	<i>Intellectus</i> Etkin Akıl ↓ ↓ ↓ Edilgin Akıl Duyum	Olanaklı Varlık
Doğal varlıklar (Oğul İsa) Ruh (İnsan)	Öz ≠ Varlık	<i>Dynameis</i> (Gizil)	↓ ↓ ↓ Duyum, istek ↓ ↓ ↓ Cisimlilik Edilgin gereklilikler	Varlık nedenini kendi dışından alan, yaratılmış Yaderk

İlahiyatın konusu tanrıdan bilimin konusu doğaya kadar, bilme ve var olma ilişkisi bu tabloda görülebilir. Aristoteles'in ontoloji dili çarpıtılarak kullanılmaktadır. Hareket tarzına bakarsak: Akıl tanrısaldir, bir melekedir ve Kutsal Ruh gibi meleklerle özgüdür. Tanrısal özden uzaklaşıp maddenin varlığına yaklaştıkça insanda gizil haldedir. İnsan akılla, bilimsel ve ilahiyat eğitimiyle aşağı varlığını tanrısal öze yaklaştırarak bütünleşmeye başlar. Özü varlığına denk mutlak bütünlük Tanrı'dır. Üniversite eğitiminin temel olan yedi özgür sanat (*septem artes liberales*) üçleme ile başlar: *Trivium*: mantık/diyalektik, gramer ve retorik. Ardından mantık ve matematikle dörtlemeye geçilir: *Quadrivium*: aritmetik, astronomi, müzik, geometri ve sonunda etik eklenir. Eğitim öğrenci yetenekliyse ilahiyatla devam eder ve olgunluğa, bütünlenmeye taşır. Ortaçağda üniversiteye *Universitas* derlerdi. "*Universitas*" bütünlük, tümlük, genellik, evrensellik demektir. Bilginin bilimsel sorgulamada ulaşacağı evrenselliği ile insan da tamamlanmış bir insan, üniversiteyle birlikte uygarlık da tamamlanmış bir uygarlık olacaktır. Ortaçağın hocaları bir yandan kilise üyesi, diğer yandan inanılmaz derecede özgür düşünün ve ders veren ustalardı. Bu bakımdan ilk akla Cusanus geliyor, bir yandan Papa'nın yardımcısı, diğer yandan uzayda akıllı canlılar olduğunu anlatıyor, sonsuzlar ve sıfır geometrisi ile evreni açıklamaya çalışıyordu. Kant'a gelirse, onda Aristoteles çok net görünüyor. Artık Kant tablosunu kendi verdiği için işimiz daha kolay:

Tablo 5. Kant'ta yetiler tablosu

Zihnin bütün yetileri	Bilme yetileri	<i>A priori</i> ilkeleri	Alanları
Bilme [cognition] yetisi	Anlama yetisi	Yasalılık	Doğa
Hoşlanma yetisi	Yargı gücü	Ereklilik	Sanat
(İsteme) Arzu yetisi	Akıl	Son erek, ideler	Özgürlük [ahlak]

Kaynak: Kant, I. (2001). *Critique of the Power of Judgement*, s. 85, (5. 198)

Kant'ta da insanın yetiler bütünlüğü ile bilgi alanlarının bütünlüğünün aynı, tek bir insan gerçekliği olduğunu görüyoruz. Kantın öncekilerden en önemli farkı,

düşünülen ve duyumsanan dünyaların ilişkisini fenomen-numen ilişkisinde tersine çevirmesi ve varlığı anlama yetisinin *a priori* kategorilerinde temellendirmesidir. İnsanın diğer yeti alanlarında varlığını tamamlaması da aynı bilme kategorileri aracılığı ile olacaktır. İşte burada yeniden *Universitas* kavramı ile karşılaşılıyor. “Nicelik” başlığı altında “çokluk-birlik” ilişkisi sonunda “bütünlük” yani *Universitas* olarak tamamlanır. *Universitas* kategorisi akılla ilişkisi bakımından diğer kategorilerden farklı bir konumdadır. Çünkü akıl özsel bir varlık değildir ve ancak insanda bütünlüklü bir bilme eylemi içinde ortaya çıkar. Yani akıl *Universitas*ın bir sonucudur, ve aklın doğası bütünlüktür. Bilme, isteme ve hoşlanma veya anlama yetisi, akıl ve yargı gücü bir *Universitas*a ermekle insan bütünlüğe erer ve bilerek isteyen ve özgürce karar veren, yani akıllı insan olur. Yoksa başkasının isteklerini yerine getirecek bilgiyle donatılmış, karar yetkisi olmayan, dıştan komutla çalışan bir heteronom varlığa dönüşür. Dış koşulların, gereklerin pragmatik belirlemesine göre değil, koşulsuz, kategorik olarak evrensel bir akıl yasası ile karar verebilen insan bütünlüklü, özerk bir akıl varlığına dönüşür. Bir düşünce varlığının, zekanın varlığı *Universitas* ilkesi ile kendini özerkleştirmesine bağlıdır.

Bu durumda *Universitas* sadece üniversite kurumunun dış çerçevesi değil aynı zamanda iç kurucu ilkesidir de, bilgi ve bilimin kurucu *a priori* ilkelerinden biridir ve üniversitenin ontolojik olarak bir kurum varlığı olmasının da kurucu normudur. Böylece üniversitenin varlığı *Universitas* ilkesinin aklın özerkliğini garantiye almasına, akli özerkleştirmesine bağlıdır. Üniversitenin özerkliği tepeden, rektörlüğün siyasetten veya ekonomiden etkilenmemesi demek değil, bundan çok daha fazlasıyla, en alttan, iş yapan bilim insanının üniversite yönetimi dahil her tür hatırı, emir ilişkisinden bağımsızca bulduğu doğruları bilimsel eleştiri sahnesine sunması ve engelsiz iddia edebilmesi demektir. Üniversitenin özerkliği “Aydınlanma Nedir”deki tanımında olduğu gibi her bireyin “kendi aklını özgürce kullanma cesareti”nde temellenir. **Üniversite aklın kamusal kullanıma sunulduğu özerk eleştirel düşünüm kurumudur** ve siyasetten bağımsızlaşarak geriye ödeyeceği görevi toplumuna, kamusal aklın eleştirel düşünümünü sunması ve ulusal aydınlanmaya hizmet etmesidir.

Aristoteles’in *prote philosophiası*, bilimlerin ilkesel bütünlüğü Kant’ta “metafizik”, yani “saf aklın arkitektonik birliği” olarak adlandırılır. Yani bilimlerin fakülteler çatısı altındaki *Universitası* bilimlerin kurucu *a priori* ilkeleri düzeyinde, transendental bir *Universitas*tır. Böyle büyük bir planla amaçlanan yarar, bir bilim dalına baktığımız zaman “*bütünü bir bakışta görebilecek, bu bilimde önemli olan temel noktaları tek tek sınavabilecek ve sunuluşuyla ilgili bazı şeyleri yapının ilk yazılışında olabileceğinden daha iyi düzenleyebilecek bir duruma*” (Kant, 1983: 12, para. 20) gelmektedir. Kant zamanında Prusya’da fakülteler, üst fakülteler (tıp, hukuk ve ilahiyat) ve alt fakülte (felsefe, yani fen-edebiyat fakültesi) şeklindeydi. Kant felsefenin üst fakülte olması ve üniversitenin kurucu fakültesi olmasını aklın özerkliği için zorunlu sayar. Üniversitenin, bilim dalları ve fakültelerin aklın özerkliği ilkesine göre düzenlenmemesi, akıl dışı, uzlaşma, oya dayalı, duygusal ve çıkarlara dayalı, rastlantısal düzenlenmesi demektir. Sonucu da bütünlüğü olmayan teknik birlik olur ve üniversite “bilim” değil “skolastik rapsodi” üretir.

Üniversite düşüncesi, Platon’dan Kant’a kadar insanın kendini bir tümel düşünce varlığı gibi yeniden tasarlayıp yaratma çabasının bir ürünüdür. Özetle, **üniversite felsefenin kurumsallaşmış halidir**. Şimdi *Universitas* ilkesini üniversitenin temel normu olarak ileri sürebilmek için onu insan-varlık bilgisine,

antropontolojik yönetime dayandırabiliriz. Aristoteles ve Kant'ın da bilim ve insan görüşlerini dayandırdıkları gibi, bütün normlar -Kuçuradi'nin (2007: 64) ifadesi ile- “*insanların içinde bulunduğu en az iki farklı tarihsel durumun, insanın bazı yapısal olanaklarının değerinin bilgisi ışığında (ya da insan onuru dediğimizizin ışığında)*” *reductio ad absurdum* ile karşılaştırılarak temellendirilebilir. Biz de aynı yoldan *Universitas* bir norm olarak kanıtlamaya girişeceğiz. Şöyle ki: Alman üniversitelerinden başlayarak yayılan Modern Avrupa üniversiteleri 20. yy ile birlikte otoritelerini Amerikan üniversitelere bıraktılar. Amerikan üniversitelerinin temeli *Universitas* ilkesini redde dayanır. Bu nedenlere kendilerine “multiversite” de derler. Böylece üniversite ve multiversite iki farklı tarihsel durumdur ve insanın yapısal olanağına bakılarak karşılaştırılabilir. Karşıtı absürt ise, *Universitas* bir norm olarak kanıtlanmış olacaktır.

Multiversiteyi hazırlayan teorik koşullar vardır. Öncelikle ilk itiraz Russell'dan gelmiştir. Fakat Russell bilimsel bütünlük düşüncesine karşı gelirken Aristoteles ve Kant'ın bütünlük ilkesini transcendental düzlemde kurduğunu atlamış ve Hegel'in *immanent*, içkin bütünlük düşüncesini yanlışlamıştır. Bilimlerin ürettiği bilgi içeriklerinin bütünlüğünü savunmak Russell'ın da haklı olarak vurguladığı gibi mistik bir hayal ve mantık hatasıdır. Analitik felsefeden gelen itiraz pragmatizmde köklü bir reddedişe ulaşır. James, Dewey ve Quine'in Aristotelesçi uygunluk ilkesini reddetmekle doğruluğu reddetmeleri, bilimlerin birbirine indirgenmesini engellemektedir. Böylece bilim *theoria* olmaktan çıkar, bir pratiğe ve teknolojiye, pazar ürününe dönüşür. Lyotard'ın *Postmodern Durum* adlı, postmodernizmin İncil'i gibi kabul edilen kitabı özetle Kant'ın Aristotelesçi *prote philosophia* düşüncesini reddetmek üzerine kurulmuştur. Bu kitapta görünen o ki, postmodernizm, pragmatizmin Avrupa versiyonu olarak aslında teorik bir başarısızlıktır. Sonunda kitap kendini yanlışlayacak şekilde konunun siyasal karar olduğunu belirtir. Marksizm de yanlış hedeflenmiş bir değerlendirme içindedir: Adorno konuyu Hegel'in *immanent*, içkin bütünlük anlayışına dayandırır ve *immanent* diyalektiğin üreteceği bütünlüğün özdeşlik ilkesine varacağını gösterir. Özdeşlik siyasal iktidarın teorik kimlik belirleme ifadesidir. Bu teorik karşı gelişlerden sadece pragmatizm durumu yanlış anlamamış ve baltayı taşa vurarak insanın özerk bir akıl varlığı olmasını engelleyecek, Kant'ının tam aksini bir ilke ileri sürmüştür. Serbest pazar ekonomisinde, sonunda bilim de insanlar da birer alete dönüşeceklerdir. Aşağıda bu çıkarımımızın uygulamalı kanıtları görülebilir.

Multiversite Amerika'da 50 yıldır uygulanmaktadır ve savunucuları kendi ağızlarından bazı sonuçlardan şikayet etmektedirler. En yetkili ağızlardan derlediğimiz şikayetler kısaca şöyledir: York Üniversitesi'nden Fallis, multiversiteyi Anglo-Amerikan dünyanın gelecek yüzyılına egemen olmayı talep etmek, başka uluslar için baskın kurum olmakla tanımlamanın yanında, demokratik gerileşme, insanbilimlerinin kültüre hizmet edemez hale gelmesi, fırsat eşitsizliği şeklinde anlatır. Kendisi multiversitelerin yararçı ilkeye dayandırıldığından, meslek odaklı bir bilme ve paralı eğitim doğurduğundan, profesörlere kâr getirmeleri için baskı yapıldığından şikayet eder. Minnesota Üniversitesi'nden Bowie, üniversite-sanayi işbirliğinin iyi olduğunu fakat yabancılaşma problemi doğurduğunu, insanın parayla ölçüldüğünü, güzel sanatların ve kültür bilimlerinin gerilediğini söyler. Rutgers Üniversitesi'nden Wilshire, öğrencilerin kişilik bütünlüğünün parçalandığından, hakikatle bağlarının zayıfladığından söz eder. Hepsinin sonuçlarından şikayet ettikleri şeyin *Universitas* ilkesinin olmamasında toplandığını söyleyebiliriz. Amerikan kültürünün bir sürü kültürü, *mass culture* doğurması da buna dayandırılabilir.

Mantıksal olarak bakarsak, insanın bütünlüğünün sağlanmadığı bir durumun insanın hakikatle bağımlı yitireceği bir ruhsal parçalanmaya yol açacağı, bununla tam adıyla yabancılaşma olacağı çok açıktır. *Reductio ad absurdum* sonuçlandırarsak, bütün bu teorik ve pratik sonuçların absürt bir durum doğurduğunu söyleyebiliriz ve böylece “*Universitas*” üniversitenin temel normu olarak kanıtlanıyor olur. *Universitas* ilkesini temel kurucu normu olarak almamız bir eğitim ve araştırma kurumu üniversite değildir, en fazla “yüksek okul” olarak adlandırılabilir.

Şimdi üniversite düşüncesinin ne olduğu ve ne olmadığını apaçık ve kesin olarak felsefi düzeyde kanıtladığımızı kabul edersek bugüne bakabiliriz. Bugün bütün Avrupa ve Türkiye’de yaşanan deneyim “Bologna süreci” olarak adlandırılmıştır. Bologna süreci AB’nin bütünleşme sürecinin bir parçası, o da Amerikan sermayesinin küreselleşme girişimine katılan en güçlü küreselleşme denemesidir. Üniversite düşüncesindeki köklü değişimin nedeni Dolar-Euro ilişkisidir. Postmodern Amerikan ticari üniversite modeli modern Avrupa araştırma üniversite modelini egemenliği altına almaktadır. İki kutuplu dünyanın çözülmesi ve 1970lerin küresel Dolar ekonomik krizinin sonucu olarak Reagan ve Thatcher öncülüğünde, geliri halkla paylaşan refah liberalizminden, sermayenin karını hedefleyen “saf pazar mantığının önündeki kolektif yapıları ortadan kaldırmak”la tanımlanan neo-liberalizme geçilmiştir. Kapitalizmin işleyiş biçimi yabancı unsurları kendine eklememesi (*articulation*) şeklindedir. En basit haliyle biz eklemelenmeyi marketlerin bakkalların pazarını ele geçirip onları silip atması şeklinde izledik. Üniversitelerdeki değişimse neo-liberalizmin üniversiteleri sermayenin önündeki kolektif yapı engeli olmaktan çıkartma ve kendine eklememe sürecidir. Modern modeli içinde, toplumsal aydınlanmaya, özgürleşme ve insanlık onuruna, özgür akla yol açacak şekilde kamusal akla eleştirel düşünüm mantığı sunmak, rasyonel bir canlılık ve bilinç katmakla görevli olan üniversite de saf pazar mantığı önünde engel olan kolektif bir yapıdır ve üniversitenin çok kâr getirecek bir şirkete dönüştürülebilmesi için bu engel ortadan kaldırılmalıdır.

“Yeni”, “üçüncü kuşak”, “demokratik”, “toplum üniversitesi” olmak gibi adlarla parlatılan olgu aslında gördüğümüz gibi insan tanımını değiştirmekte, AB’nin resmi ifadesiyle “işçi pazarına nitelikli uzman” insanı, felsefi adlandırılmayla “köle”yi hedeflemektedir. Sonuç, insanlığın türsel olarak yabancılaşması ve uç noktada distopyadır. Hedef üniversitelerin şirketleşmesidir. Şirket üniversitelerinin yönetimi “demokrasi” adı altında, “halkı”, yani sermayenin arkasındaki siyasal cemaatleri temsil eden mütevellî heyetlerine verilecektir. Rektörlük içerden seçimle gelen akademik meslektaşlardan değil, siyasetin atadığı profesyonel işletmeci yakınardan oluşacaktır. Eğitim yüksek ücretle paralı olacaktır. Amerikan cemaat üniversite modeli gelecektir. Öğrenci burs bulmadan okuyamayacak, bursu verecek otoriteler sermayelerini kendi içinde kullanmak isteyecek ve yabancıya burs vermeyecektir. Böylece eğitim ve nitelikli insan kaynağı da siyasal finans kaynaklarına ait olacaktır. Kısaca Wissema’nın dediği gibi, para bulamayan öğrenci okuyamayacak, sanayiden proje, halktan öğrenci bularak kâr getirmeyen hocalar kovulacak, zarar eden üniversiteler kapatılacak, temel klasik hümanist kültür değerleri ortadan kaldırılacak, kâr getiren bilgi kolları ve girişimci projelerin eğitimi verilecektir. Artık distopyaları edebiyatçılar değil, “demokrasi” adı altında plütokratik güçler, sermaye-siyaset birliği, “seçkin bir yararçı sınıf” yazmaktadır.

Anahtar Sözcükler

Universitas, multiversite, Kant, üçüncü uşak üniversite, yabancılaşma.

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